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 This thesis examines different elements of security cooperation and intelligence 
sharing within the European Union.  The first chapter examines how the growth of the 
European Union has affected security cooperation among member states post-Cold War 
through the examination of the creation of security based institutions, weapons policies, 
and military forces and capabilities.  The finding of this chapter is that the growth of the 
European Union has increased security cooperation among member states.  The second 
chapter of this thesis compares intelligence sharing between the European Union and 
NATO.  To determine which organization’s intelligence sharing was more effective, the 
chapter examines the actors and relationships, trust, institutions, infrastructure, and 
resources of each organization as compared to their ability to bolster or hinder 
intelligence sharing amongst member states.  The conclusion of this chapter is that 
despite being roughly the same sized organization, NATO enjoys a greater level of 
intelligence sharing than the members of the European Union due to the level of mistrust, 
voluntary participation, and restricted intelligence dissemination process of the European 
Union.  The third and final chapter determines if the economic crises of states within the 
European Union have had an adverse effect on security cooperation among member 
states.  This is determined by examining the particulars of each country’s economic crisis 
and bailout, defense spending, and governmental social spending prior to, during, and 
after the economic crisis.  The finding of this chapter is that the economic crises did have 
an adverse affect on security cooperation.  The amount of impact that economic crises 
had on security cooperation varied in each case study.  Overall the three chapters of this 
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portfolio highlight a number of factors that affect security cooperation within the 
European Union.   
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 For more than 3,000 years there have been innumerable proposals for collective 
security systems.  The oldest such example of a collective security system is that of the 
Amphictyonic League, which was formed by Greek city-states.  The purpose of the 
collective security system formed by the city-states was to protect all cities of the 
Amphictyons and was upheld by a vow of all the city-states to march united against any 
aggressor that threatened one of the member states.1  This example is one that shows a 
successful collective security system.  While there have been numerous proposals for 
collective security systems throughout history, there have been fewer attempts to put 
specific plans in place and even fewer successful collective security efforts.  The purpose 
of this thesis portfolio is to study one of the world’s most powerful emerging regional 
organizations, the European Union, to examine the factors that have helped and hindered 
security cooperation within the European Union as well as examine various external 
factors, specifically the recent financial crises to examine the impact on security 
cooperation. 
Security cooperation, as defined by the United States Department of Defense in 
2004, is “all interactions with foreign establishments to build defense relationships that 
promote security interests and develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-
defense and multinational operations.”2  While in theory security cooperation seems 
straight forward, it is important to recognize that there are a number of factors that have 
1 Ulusoy, Hasan,  “Collective Security in Europe,”  http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Hasan-
Ulusoy2.pdf (accessed September 12, 2014). 
2 “Introduction to Security Cooperation,” Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 




                                                          
the ability to, and often affect a state’s willingness to promote and or participate in 
security cooperation within regional and international organizations. 
  Chapter one of this thesis is entitled “The Growth of the European Union and 
Security Cooperation”.  The research question for this chapter is how has the growth of 
the European Union affected security cooperation among member states post-Cold War?  
After examining the expansion of the European Union in 1995 and 2004, the chapter 
states that the growth of the European Union has yielded an increase in security 
cooperation.  The indicators used to support this finding are an examination of security 
based institutions, weapons policies, and military forces and capabilities.   
To help determine how the three indicators listed above contributed to an increase 
in security cooperation among EU member states; this chapter examines two case studies.  
The first case study examines the creation of security based institutions, weapons 
policies, and military forces and capabilities in regards to the 1995 enlargement of the 
European Union.  The 1995 enlargement was seen as a natural progression of European 
integration after the cold war and included Austria, Finland, and Sweden.  The second 
case study examines the 2004 enlargement of the EU, the single largest expansion of the 
European Union in terms of territory, number of states, and population.  This enlargement 
included ten countries including:  Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
  The main findings that the research produced in terms of the creation of security 
based institutions is that during both major expansions there was a dramatic increase in 
the creation of security based institutions.  During the 1995 expansion the new security 
based institutions played a helpful, but not essential role in creating trust and cohesion 
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amongst the existing member states.  Throughout the 2004 expansion the security based 
institutions played a pivotal role in developing and enhancing security cooperation 
among member states and the new members because they created forums for states with 
fundamentally different frameworks, thoughts, and resources to have the ability to work 
together and create common trust and values.  The creation of common trust and values 
that these institutions helped make attainable led to an increase in security cooperation.  
In terms of weapons policies the creation of policies to control weapons, including a 
strategy to prevent the creation and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction while also 
creating a the European Defense Agency (EDA) to support defense capabilities of all 
European Union member states arguably also increased security cooperation among 
member states.  The last indicator examined in this chapter, military forces and 
capabilities, also produced evidence that due to the creation of the EU Military Staff and 
establishment of EU battle groups produced avenues that encourage sharing of 
information particularly within the military realm with member states which ultimately 
leads to an overall increase in security cooperation. 
 The literature review for this chapter provides information on the re-emerging 
view of security communities as founded by Karl Deutsch and also examines the two 
dominant schools of thoughts on organizational growth and cooperation as presented by 
Kenneth Oye and Joseph Grieco. The positive results in this section were found by 
examining scholarly literature and current new articles discussing the expansion of the 
European Union and the impacts that had on security cooperation.  It was through the 
examination of these documents that the results of this chapter became evident.    
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Chapter two of this thesis is entitled “Intelligence Sharing within the European 
Union and NATO”.  The research question for this chapter is what factors affect 
intelligence sharing within the European Union and NATO?  After examining the four 
potential factors that affect intelligence sharing within international organizations 
including:  actors and relationships, the degree of trust among states, institutions, and 
infrastructure, the chapter shows that intelligence sharing within the EU and NATO is 
vastly different and offers recommendations drawn from the NATO example of 
intelligence sharing to increase intelligence sharing within the EU. 
To help determine the varied levels of intelligence sharing the chapter examines 
the four factors identified as affecting intelligence sharing in relation to the European 
Union and NATO.  The actors and relationships section examines the hierarchical 
agreements within the organization.  The trust segment scrutinizes the rules governing 
intelligence sharing and public comments made by prominent members of the 
organization.  The institution piece examines the number of institutions designed to 
facilitate intelligence sharing, the level of participation, and the ability to disseminate 
intelligence among member states.  Finally, the infrastructure and resources of the 
organizations pays particular attention to the state of the intranet.      
The main findings that the research produced when examining the four factors 
that affect intelligence sharing as compared to the two organizations in question is that 
the European Union suffered from an overall lower level of intelligence sharing as 
compared to NATO.  While the European Union and NATO are roughly the same sized 
organizations, the EU lacks a dominant state able to create hierarchical agreements within 
the EU while NATO, possessing a dominant state with the United States of America is 
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marked by hierarchical relationships.  Additionally, the institutions within the EU lack 
rules requiring member states to share intelligence while NATO has established trust 
through frequent, successful intelligence transactions among member states.  
Institutionally, although the EU has the same number of groups designed to facilitate 
intelligence sharing as NATO, they are marred by voluntary and often incomplete 
participation of member states and have a restricted dissemination process within 
Europol.   
 Chapter three of this thesis is entitled “Economic Crisis and Security Cooperation 
within the European Union”.  The research question for this chapter is how has the 
economic crisis in Europe affected security cooperation?  After examining three case 
studies, the chapter shows that the economic crisis did have an adverse effect on security 
cooperation.  In order to come to the conclusion provided above, this chapter examines 
three case studies.  The three case studies examine the economic crisis and bailout, 
defense spending, and social spending of Greece, Spain, and Portugal.   
The main finding that the research produced is that the economic crisis did have 
an adverse effect on security cooperation within the European Union.  In the case of 
Greece the countries defense spending directly affected by the economic crisis while their 
governmental social spending stayed stable throughout the crisis indicating that the 
political will and public support for security cooperation decreased.  Spain’s defense 
spending was directly correlated to the health of the state while their governmental social 
spending increased while defense spending fell as well as increased at a rate faster than 
that of their defense spending when it rose.  In the case of Spain it was concluded that 
while political will stayed fairly neutral throughout the economic crisis, the public 
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support for security cooperation fell slightly during and after the crisis as indicated by 
social spending numbers as compared to defense spending.  Finally, in the case of 
Portugal defense spending fell as budget deficits increased while social spending held 
steady at levels seen prior to the economic crisis indicating that the political will and 
public support for security cooperation declined. 
The literature review for this chapter surveys four varied definitions of collective 
security as well as presents the four principles of collective security as presented by 
Rourke and Boyer.  This chapter was built on a theoretical framework but was bolstered 
by current news stories detailing the emerging information of the economic crises within 

















Chapter 1:  The Growth of the European Union and Security Cooperation 
 
For decades scholars and leaders around the world have been examining and 
debating the effectiveness of regional organizations.  With an ever connected world, this 
examination has come to the forefront of research, especially in the security cooperation 
arena.  The aim of this chapter is to determine how the growth of the European Union has 
affected security cooperation among member states in the post-Cold War era.  First, this 
chapter will introduce working definitions of a regional organization and security 
cooperation and the specific indicators extrapolated from that definition used to identify 
the effectiveness of security cooperation.  It will then offer information on the re-
emerging view of security communities as founded by Karl Deutsch and examine the two 
dominant schools of thoughts on organizational growth and cooperation as presented by 
Kenneth Oye and Joseph Grieco.  Subsequently, this chapter will explore examples of 
each indicator which have resulted in a decrease in security cooperation, as well as an 
increase in security cooperation.  Finally, this chapter will attempt to show that the 
growth of the European Union, after the Cold War, has increased security cooperation 
among member states by examining security cooperation after the last two large 
expansions of the Union.  
In order to examine the European Union as a regional organization it is imperative 
to understand the definition of a regional organization.  Regional organizations, 
according to the United Nation, are “organizations that incorporate international 
membership and encompass geopolitical entities that transcend a single nation state,” 
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whose membership is characterized by similar defining characteristics.3  Most regional 
organizations ultimate aim is to foster cooperation among member states and states 
closely associated with that organization.  While many regional organizations are formed 
with this purpose in mind, few achieve complete success, specifically in the realm of 
security cooperation.   
The phrase “security cooperation” has a number of competing definitions.  For the 
purpose of this paper, the working definition of security cooperation will be based around 
a loose interpretation of the phrase by the United States Department of Defense, 
established in 2004, which outlines security cooperation as, “all interactions with foreign 
establishments to build defense relationships that promote security interests and develop 
allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.”4  
While this definition of security cooperation is vague by design, it suggests three major 
indicators that can examine the level of security cooperation occurring within regional 
organizations.  These are:  the creation of security based institutions and initiatives 
among regional organizations, policies toward developing weapons and controlling 
weapons acquisitions outside the organizational structure and the military forces and 
capabilities of each regional organization.  Current literature on security cooperation 
among members of regional organizations tends to be limited in scope and quantity, 
especially when examining growing regional organizations.   
Until the late 1940’s the realist consensus, shared by the majority of the political 
community, was that states could not work in meaningful cooperative groups because 
3 "Cooperation with regional organizations,"  United Nations, Annual Report of the Secretary-General on 
the work of the Organization (1995). 
4 “Introduction to Security Cooperation,” Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 
http://www.disam.dsca.mil/DR/01b%20Chapter.pdf (accessed January 30, 2012). 
8 
 
                                                          
anarchy ultimately caused the states to seek advantage over their neighbors.5  However, 
this theory was contested in the early 1950’s with the proposal of the concept of security 
communities by Richard Van Wagenen.  While a celebrated alternative to the realist 
school of thought, this concept was not developed until 1957 when Karl Deutsch offered 
the first empirical and theoretical study of security communities.6  This study yielded 
major advances in the understanding of security communities.  First, it defined security 
communities as, “a group of people, or states that had become integrated to the point that 
there is an assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other, but 
settle their disputes in some other way.”7  Secondly, it delineated between two types of 
security communities:  pluralistic and amalgamated.  While Karl Deutsch’s study offered 
an alternative to the widely held belief that anarchy ultimately did not allow for 
cooperation among states to occur, the theory was largely unsupported and not further 
researched until after the Cold War.  While Deutsch provided fundamental information 
on cooperation of security communities, only a few scholars have provided a framework 
for examining the effect of organizational growth on security cooperation.   
The first school of thought, as presented by Kenneth Oye, suggests that a growth 
of actors decreases cooperation.  Oye, in Cooperation Under Anarchy, hypothesizes that, 
“The prospects for cooperation diminish as the number of players increases because the 
problem with large numbers is defection.”8  Alternatively, there are two dominant 
schools of thoughts that challenge Oye’s theory that an increase in actors decreases 
5 Adler, Emmanual, and Michael Barnett. Security Communities.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
1998. 
6 Ibid, 6. 
7 Ibid, 6. 
8 Helen Milner, “International Theories of Cooperation among Nations:  Strengths and Weaknesses,” 
World Politics 44 (1992):  466-496. 
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cooperation.  Joseph Grieco proposes the first alternative to Oye’s hypothesis by arguing, 
“A larger number of players may be better because it provides more opportunities and 
enhances the likelihood of relative gains.”9  Echoing Grieco, Duncan Snidal states, “The 
possibility of cooperation in a relative gains environment can be enhanced by increasing 
the number of players.”10  Both schools of thought are supported by examples from 
security communities in major regional organizations around the world when examined 
in conjunction with this paper’s indicators of security cooperation.  
Security Based Institutions 
 The first indicator utilized to examine the level of security cooperation occurring 
within regional organizations is the creation of security based institutions and initiatives.  
Under the liberal intuitionalist theory, states, as rational actors, must believe that 
institutionalized coordination and cooperation will serve their interests in order to 
successfully participate in regional organizations.11  Security based institutions provide a 
forum for states within a regional organization to build trust through frequent interactions 
among members.  These frequent interactions create cohesion and help develop common 
values, which are both fundamental building blocks to the creation of security 
communities in the constructivist approach.  The constructivist approach emphasizes that 
a community refers to a collectivity of shared norms among its members due to common 
values, identities and goals, which ultimately create a feeling of solidarity among 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Laurie Nathan, “The Peacemaking Effectiveness of Regional Organisations,” Crisis States Research 




                                                          
members.12  In turn, this collective identify that has been created among members leads 
to established patterns of actions, which creates a sense of security.  Therefore, if a 
growing regional organization can establish numerous successful security based 
institutions and initiatives, which leads to cooperation and development of common 
values in the security arena, they should experience an increase in security cooperation 
among member states.  Regional organizations around the world have provided examples 
of both failed and successful attempts at establishing security based institutions and 
initiatives and its effects on the organization’s security cooperation. 
   The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is an example of a regional 
organization that has undergone three periods of growth after the Cold War, but has 
failed to successfully create security based institutions and initiatives.  This was 
exemplified with ASEAN’s inability to formally create a Political-Security Community 
(APSC).  On March 1, 2009 an APSC blueprint was presented and accepted at the 14th 
annual ASEAN summit, but to date has not been formally established.13  Because 
ASEAN has failed to launch successful security based institutions and initiatives with all 
current members, they have not had a forum to continue to build trust through a collective 
identity, which has ultimately led to stagnant security cooperation. 
In contrast to ASEAN’s failure to create security based institutions, the African 
Union (AU), which has also seen a consistent growth in member states, has made 
significant strides.  Its first success was seen in 2003 with the creation of the Peace and 
Security Council.  This council is responsible for the deployment of peacekeeping and 
12 Raimo Vayrynen, “Stable Peace Through Security Communities?  Steps Towards Theory-Building,” in 
Stable Peace Among Nations, 157-186.  Maryland:  Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000. 
13 ASEAN, http://www.aseansec.org/ (accessed February 22, 2012). 
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quick intervention missions on the African continent.14  Less than a year later, the 
African Union once again made strides to increase security cooperation among member 
states by adopting and implementing the Common African Defense and Security Policy 
(CADSP), which aims to ensure the defense of Africa, using both traditional and non-
traditional military forces.15  The creation of the Peace and Security Council has provided 
an arena for AU members to be in frequent communication, which arguably has led to 
increased trust and ultimately improved security cooperation. 
Weapons 
The second indicator utilized to examine the level of security cooperation 
occurring within regional organizations is the policies towards developing weapons and 
controlling weapons acquisitions outside the organizational structure.  This is an 
important feature of the rationalist approach to the theory of security communities and as 
a result security cooperation.  The rationalist approach to communities states that 
members of a community try to control the resources that are of value to them, within a 
security community those resources arguably encompass weapons.16  Because no 
member can ultimately control all resources by themselves, they have to engage in 
transactions with other members of the security community or regional organization.17  
This interaction typically leads to the creation of mutual interests among members 
involved and ultimately leads to a level of security cooperation. 
14 “African Union,” African Union, http://www.au.int/en/ (accessed February 20, 2012). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Raimo Vayrynen, “Stable Peace Through Security Communities?  Steps Towards Theory-Building,” in 
Stable Peace Among Nations, 157-186.  Maryland:  Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000. 
17 Ibid, 164. 
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Consistent with Kenneth’s Oye’s hypothesis, ASEAN once again demonstrates 
the inability of a regional organization that has experienced growth to cooperate in the 
realm of weapons policies.  ASEAN’s founding members have proposed the creation of a 
Defense Industry Collaboration (ADIC) among member states.  This collaboration would 
encourage cost savings on defense spending and incorporate weapons standards across 
the organization.18  While this proposition seems good in theory, it poses two great 
challenges that have resulted in a decrease in security cooperation as related to weapons.  
First, the proposition by the founding members fails to recognize the disparity in the 
member states knowledge and industrial base for producing weapons.19  Secondly, it fails 
to recognize that budgets for defense vary among member nations.  These two missteps 
by the ADIC have resulted in member states directing resources “towards externally 
oriented weapons systems, including submarines, surface ships, fighter aircrafts, and 
missiles,” which suggests that the members of ASEAN are engaged in a “competitive 
arms process.”20  Because of their engagement in a competitive arms process, member 
states are still ultimately trying to accumulate all needed resources on an individual basis, 
which does not lend itself to successful security cooperation. 
Exemplifying Grieco and Snidal’s hypotheses that growth in a regional 
organization increases security cooperation because it increases the chance for relative 
gains specifically in weapons policies is the AU.  The AU has seen the adoption of two 
major weapons policies including:  the Treaty of the African Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone, 
18 Ahmad Hamidi, “ASEAN Defense Industry Collaboration,” ZULFAQAR: JURNAL ASIA 





                                                          
as well as the Common Position on Illicit Proliferation, Circulation, and Trafficking of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons, adopted in 2000.21   
Military Forces 
The third indicator utilized to examine the level of military security cooperation 
occurring within regional organizations is the military force and capabilities.  Developing 
and maintaining military forces is an important indicator of security cooperation within 
regional organizations because they are arguably a key indicator of collective defense.  
Collective defense by definition is a “coalition of nations which agree to defend its own 
group against outside attacks.”22  In order to defend a collection of nations from outside 
attacks one aspect that must be examined is the coalition’s ability to maintain military 
forces.  If a regional organization has strong military capabilities both internally and 
externally their ability to defend themselves is arguably very strong.  If the nations in a 
coalition feel as though they are militarily secure the likelihood of them participating in 
regional organizations increase, and ultimately security cooperation increases.  
Conversely, if a regional organization is lacking strong military capabilities their ability 
to defend themselves weakens.  If the states involved in the regional organization do not 
feel militarily secure, their tendency to share information, and thus increase security 
cooperation will be much weaker or may not occur. 
ASEAN and the AU both lend themselves to exemplifying the ability of a 
growing regional organization to increase security cooperation in military forces and 
capabilities.  Currently, ASEAN engages in bilateral military exercises that span across 
21 “African Union,” African Union, http://www.au.int/en/ (accessed February 20, 2012). 
22  “Collective Security,”  http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/good7497.htm (accessed 
November 20, 2012). 
14 
 
                                                          
air, naval and land forces.23  Member states have also increased security cooperation in 
the military arena by engaging in officer exchanges.24  However, ASEAN is not the 
strongest example of a correlation between growth and military cooperation as the 
member states “still lack a common language and doctrine, as well as a war reserve 
contingency pool.”25  The AU is a more advanced example that indicates the relationship 
between growth of a regional organization and an increase in military security 
cooperation.  The Peace and Security Council of the AU, a security institution established 
during the organization’s periods of growth, currently has military and peacekeeping 
missions launched in:  Darfur, Comoros, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Burundi, and other African States.26  These military and peacekeeping missions are made 
possible because the AU established the African Standby Force, which is the current 
standing army of the African Union. 
While the current international arena offers two distinct schools of thought in 
relation to security cooperation in growing regional organizations, it does little to offer 
specific examples and case studies to promote a prominent theory on the subject.  This 
chapter will specifically focus on examining the European Union’s (EU) expansion at 
two distinct times to ultimately determine if security cooperation increases as a regional 
organization grows in size. 
 
 
23 Amitav Acharya, “Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World:  A Conceptual Analysis 
of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN,” Journal of Peace Research 29 (1992):  7-21. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 “African Union,” African Union, http://www.au.int/en/ (accessed February 20, 2012). 
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The European Union 
The European Union and its predecessor, the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), share over a 50 year history of making significant changes to the 
European environment.  The European Coal and Steel Community was established on 
July 23, 1952 with six members including:  Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.27  From the time of its founding, until the Treaty on 
European Union was signed at Maastricht on February 7, 1992, the ECSC saw a growth 
of 6 members, which included:  Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, 
and Spain.28  While the ECSC doubled its original size in a span of 34 years the European 
Union has seen an increase of fifteen members in just half that time.29  This dramatic 
increase in growth inadvertently has had an impact on the security cooperation among 
member states and the two case studies provided in the following sections will provide 
the opportunity to examine how the growth of the European Union, following the Cold 
war, has affected security cooperation among member states in the context of the creation 
of security institutions and initiatives, weapons policies, and military capabilities.  When 
examined against the three working indicators of this paper’s definition of security 
cooperation and coinciding with the trends of current literature addressing the growth of 
the European Union, it becomes apparent that the European Union’s growth has had a 
positive impact on security cooperation among member states in the post-Cold War era.   
 
27 “The History of the European Union,”  European Union, http://www.europa.eu/about-eu/eu-





                                                          
European Union: 1995 Enlargement 
 The 1995 enlargement was seen as a natural progression in European integration 
after the Cold War.  After the USSR fell, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the 
European Union, bringing the total number of member states to 15.30  All three countries 
were similar sizes to EU member states, were democratically developed, and rich enough 
to become net contributors to the EU.31  With this enlargement there was positive growth 
in all three security cooperation indicators. 
Security Based Institutions and Initiatives:  1995 Enlargement 
 The great advancements in the creation of security based institutions and 
initiatives began in the late 1990’s with the establishment of Europol in 1999.  Europol is 
the European law enforcement agency that was created to focus on security priorities that 
include:  illegal trafficking, terrorism, forgery and cyber crime.32  Europol’s major 
objective is to improve intelligence sharing in these fields between member states, rather 
than directly engaging in the policing of these matters.  Europol accomplishes the 
facilitation of intelligence sharing four ways.  First, it obtains and analyses intelligence 
provided by all member states.33  Second, it notifies member states when it has 
“information concerning them and of any connections identified between criminal 
offenses.”34  It also prepares and provides “general situation reports” to all member states 
30 Ibid. 
31 Jones, Seth G.  The Rise of European Security Cooperation.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
2007. 
32 Europol, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/about-europol-17 (accessed March 1, 2012). 





                                                          
and provides “strategic intelligence.”35  Finally, since April 2002, it has created small, 
ad-hoc groups composed of Europol staff and staff from member states to collect shared 
intelligence on terrorist groups of interest.36  Most information collected by Europol is 
available through the principal intelligence-sharing system, the European computer 
system, also known as TECS.37  The European computer system contains two types of 
intelligence:  information about individuals and groups suspected of having committed or 
likely to commit a crime and “work files” intelligence that provides the details of specific 
offenses committed, which includes general characteristic information and other relevant 
information.38 
 The next great advancements seen after the 1995 enlargement of the EU in the 
creation of security institutions and initiatives came with the establishment of the EU 
Institute of Security Studies in 2002, and the establishment of the European Security 
Strategy in 2003.  The EU Institute of Security Studies (EUISS) is an autonomous EU 
agency that researches relevant security issues for the EU and provides independent 
findings and analyses to member states and to the High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy.39  The EUISS conducts its research on a number of topics 
and regions of interest to the EU around the world.  Currently the European Union’s 
immediate priorities fall to those nations that lie within close proximity to EU member 
states, but they also extend to regions of growing importance, such as Asia, as well as 
35 Ibid, 632. 
36 Ibid, 632. 
37 Ibid, 632. 
38 Ibid, 632. 




                                                          
traditional allies, which include the United States.40  Topically, the EUISS currently 
researches four main areas including:  global governance, disarmament, the Common 
Security Defense Policy (CSDP), and EU foreign policy.41 
 The European Security Strategy was adopted by the Brussels European Council 
on December 12 and 13, 2003.  The aim of the European Security Strategy is to identify 
emerging global threats and outline the EU’s strategic objectives to combat the identified 
threats.  The threats identified in the European Security Strategy include:  terrorism, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and 
organized crime.42  The strategic objectives outlined to address the emerging threats are 
to:  address the threats, build security in the EU neighborhoods, which includes 
promoting the emergence of well-governed countries to the East of EU, and developing 
an international order based on multilateralism.43  The European Security Strategy 
concludes by suggesting that in order to successfully fulfill the strategic objectives the 
European Union needs to be more active in pursing the objectives, increase its defense 
capabilities, pursue coherent policies, and work with its partners through bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation.44  The establishment of Europol, the EU Institute for Security 
Studies, and the creation of the European Security Strategy were three major 
advancements in the realm of security based institutions that were attributed, at least in 
part, to the growth of the European Union during that time.  While both institutions and 
the European Security Strategy could have been established without the additional 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42  “European Security Strategy,” European Union, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_organised_crime/r00004_en





                                                          
member states of the European Union, they arguably were created because the number of 
EU members had outgrown the current security institution framework and needed 
additional guidance to maintain and increase security cooperation among EU member 
states.  
Weapons Policies:  1995 Enlargement 
Closely tied to one of the major topical components of focus of the EU Institute 
for Security Studies and explicitly stated in the European Security Strategy, the EU has 
seen moderate advancements in security cooperation as related to policies towards 
controlling weapons acquisitions with the establishment of the EU strategy against the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in 2003.  The message stated in the strategy 
is that, “The European Union must act with resolve, using all instruments and policies at 
its disposal, to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate programs for the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles.”45 While the strategy 
clearly outlines the threat of WMD’s, it goes a step further to outline the four major 
actions the European Union needs to implement and follow in order to accomplish the 
aims of the strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  Those four 
actions are:  resolute action against proliferators, creating a stable international and 
regional environment, cooperating closely with the United States and other close allies, 
45 “Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,”  European Union, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/l3323
4_en.htm (accessed February 20, 2012). 
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and developing necessary structures within the European Union to monitor and 
implement the strategy.46 
Military Forces:  1995 Enlargement 
 Finally, the European Union, during this expansion, showed a significant 
improvement in the military forces, the final component examined in conjunction with 
security cooperation, for the purposes of this paper.  On June 2001, six years after the 
expansion, the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) was created to support the 
Military Committee and the Political and Security Committee.47  EUMS has greatly 
increased EU security cooperation in the military sector, as it is a body that is made up of 
military experts from all member states and provides an early-warning capability and 
plans, assesses and makes recommendations on general military strategy and crisis 
management.48  Specifically the EUMS is responsible for:  monitoring potential crisis 
situations, carrying out the military aspects of strategic planning, programming, planning, 
conducting, and evaluating the military aspect of the EU’s crisis management procedures, 
establishing permanent relations with NATO, and contributing to the military aspects of 
the ESDP.49  As a whole the European Union Military Staff is the key component of 
military planning in the European Union today, and was established during the first 
enlargement after the Cold War.   
 
46 Ibid. 
47 James Walsh, “Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union:  Institutions Are Not Enough,” JCMS 44 
(2006): 625-643. 
48 Ibid, 633. 
49 Ibid, 633. 
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European Union:  2004 Enlargement 
 The 2004 enlargement marked the largest, single expansion of the European 
Union in terms of territory, number of states and population and was fundamentally 
different than that of the 1995 expansion.  First, this enlargement was comprised of ten 
countries which included:  Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.  Secondly, the 2004 enlargement was viewed as an 
adaptive integration of countries, as opposed to the natural progression of 1995 because 
of the heterogeneous composition of the countries included.50  All of the new countries, 
with the exception of Poland, were medium sized, small or micro states, which did not 
provide a great deal of financial capabilities to the European Union.51  Finally, the 
existing EU-15 had concerns about the prospects of deepening European integration with 
the addition of ten new member states, with specific emphasis placed on safeguarding the 
political, economic and security interests of existing member states.52  For this reason the 
new member states experienced an extended period of gradual adaptation and integration, 
which included the monitoring and measuring of legal obligations set forth for 
membership into the EU, coupled with sets of norms and expectations presented by the 
EU.53  While the enlargement varied vastly from that of 1995, positive growth in all three 
areas of security cooperation was once again observed.  The continued confidence of the 
European Union, coupled with the need for additional and updated security based policy 
50 Jones, Seth G.  The Rise of European Security Cooperation.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
2007. 





                                                          
and infrastructure after each EU growth has paved the path for increased security 
cooperation. 
Security Based Institutions and Initiatives:  2004 Enlargement 
 The years following the 2004 enlargement of the European Union were marked 
by multiple advances in the creation of security based institutions and initiatives, 
including two great accomplishments:  the updated Common Foreign Security Policy and 
the creation of the European Security and Defense College.  The Common Foreign 
Security Policy (CFSP) is the foreign policy of the European Union, with a specific focus 
directed on security and defense actions and diplomacy.  In 2009, roughly five years after 
the 2004 enlargement, the Lisbon Treaty provided great advancements to the CFSP.  
First, the treaty created the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy.54  This creation combined the previous roles of the High 
Representative for the CFSP and the External Affairs Commissioner, and has created an 
arena in which the High Representative coordinates differing positions regarding foreign 
and security policies, as well as speaks on behalf of the EU’s security policies.55  
Secondly, it created a new European External Action Service (EEAS).  The EEAS is a 
diplomatic corps for the EU that has intelligence capabilities and among other things, 
manages the EU’s response to crisis situations.  The EEAS’s intelligence capabilities are 
comprised of the Situation Centre and the Watch-Keeping Capability.56  The Situation 
Centre has a staff comprised of just over 100 intelligence analysts from member states 
who collect and share classified information and produce reports on important topics.  In 
54  “Foreign and Security Policy,” European Union, http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm (accessed 
January 30, 2012). 
55 Ibid. 
56 Rettman, Andrew, “EU Diplomats to Benefit from New Intelligence Hub,” EU Observer. 
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addition to the Situation Centre, The Watch-Keeping Capability is comprised of 12 police 
and military officers whose primary focus is to gather news from the European Union’s 
overseas missions.57  Finally, the updated CFSP has increased the use of qualified 
majority voting, thus limiting the areas where states can exercise their ability to veto 
certain military and defense issues.58  The updated CFSP has enhanced security 
cooperation within the European Union by emphasizing shared goals and values while 
providing an arena to collect and share diplomatic and defense resources. 
 Four years prior to the updated CFSP, in 2005, the European Security and 
Defense College (ESDC) was created, marking another significant advancement in the 
creation of security based institutions.  The main objective of the ESDC is to “provide 
training in the field of European Security and Defense Policy at the strategic level in 
order to promote a common understanding of the European Security Defense Policy 
(ESDP) among civilian and military personnel.”59  By providing training, the ESDC aims 
to enhance the European security culture, promote a better understanding of the ESDP, 





58 “Foreign and Security Policy,” European Union, http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm (accessed 
January 30, 2012). 
59 “European Security and Defense College,” European Union, 
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Weapons Policies: 2004 Enlargement 
 The 2004 enlargement also coincided with a major advancement in weapons 
policies and defense with the creation of the European Defense Agency (EDA).  The 
EDA was created July 12, 2004 under a Joint Action of the Council of Ministers, “to 
support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defense 
capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European Security and 
Defense Policy.”61  The four major functions set forth for the EDA include:  developing 
defense capabilities, promoting defense research and technology, promoting armaments 
cooperation and creating a competitive European Defense Equipment Market.62  
Military Forces:  2004 Enlargement 
 To date the European Union does not have a standing military, but on November 
22, 2004 during the Military Capability Commitment Conference, member states of the 
European Union committed to creating battle groups, and in 2007 those battle groups 
became operational.  Battle groups are military units of the European Union that consist 
of military personnel from member states.  The European Union currently has eighteen 
operational battle groups, consisting of 1,500 troops each, which rotate to ensure that two 
battle groups are ready for deployment at all times.63  The battle groups can be deployed 
and on the ground within 5 to 10 days of approval by the European Council, and must be 
sustainable for action from 30 to 120 days.  The main tasks the battle groups are assigned 
to stem directly from the Common Security and Defense Policy and typically involve:  
61 European Defense Agency,  http://www.eda.europa.eu (accessed February 27, 2012). 
62 Ibid. 
63 “New force behind EU foreign policy,” BBC News ( accessed April 10, 2012).  
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joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and 
assistance and conflict prevention and peacekeeping.64 
Conclusion 
After examining specific examples of each indicator outlined to demonstrate an 
increase or decrease in security cooperation among regional organizations, it becomes 
apparent that the hypothesis of this chapter, that the growth of the European Union has 
yielded an increase in security cooperation among member states is correct for the 
following reasons.   
First, the European Union has seen a dramatic increase in the creation of security 
based institutions and initiatives in the post-Cold War era during both major expansions, 
occurring in 1995 and 2004.  During the 1995 expansion these institutions and initiatives 
played a helpful, but not pivotal role in creating cohesion and trust among the existing 
member states and the newly added member states because of the similarity of the states.  
However, during the 2004 expansion the creation of new security based institutions and 
initiatives played an extremely critical role in developing and enhancing security 
cooperation among existing member states and the 10 new member states because they 
created forums for members with fundamentally different frameworks, thoughts and 
resources to have the ability to work together and create trust and common values.  The 
creation of trust and common values has led to cooperation among member states and has 
led to an increase in security cooperation.  While these institutions and policies could 
have been developed without the expansion of the European Union, they arguably came 
64 “Foreign and Security Policy,” European Union, http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm (accessed 
January 30, 2012). 
26 
 
                                                          
to fruition quicker because of the acknowledged need for an updated security based 
infrastructure to accommodate additional members of a rapidly growing regional 
organization. 
Coupled with a large growth in the creation of security based institutions and 
initiatives, the European Union experienced moderate growth in the development of 
weapons and creation of weapons policies both on an internal and external level.  
Following the 1995 enlargement the European Union created a strategy against the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  This strategy was aimed at using all 
possible EU resources to prevent the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD).  Following a little over a year after the creation of this strategy and 
the next large expansion of the regional organization the European Union once again took 
a decisive step in encouraging security cooperation through the creation of weapons 
policies.  In July of 2004, the European Defense Agency was created to support member 
states in all aspects relating to defense capabilities.  Both strides in the realm of the 
development of weapons and the creations of policies to control weapons have arguably 
bolstered the notion of collective defense through shared resources among EU member 
states.  By devising a strategy to prevent the creation and acquisition of WMD’s while 
also creating a European Agency to support defense capabilities of all EU member states, 
when examined against the concept of collective defense would arguably increase 
security cooperation among members of the European Union because of the sense of 
security created by both this policy and creation of this defense institution.  
Finally, the European Union has seen progress in the establishment of and in 
relation to military forces.  The 1995 enlargement was marked by the creation of the 
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European Union Military Staff, a body composed of military experts from all member 
states.  And in the same year as the 2004 enlargement, the single largest enlargement of 
the European Union to date, the member states once again recorded a success in relation 
to military forces the establishment of battle groups.  Both successes in the military 
forces arena have allowed for member states to have the ability to feel as though they 
have an offensive edge in collective defense of the European Union, which has created a 
sense of security and has opened up avenues that encourage the sharing of information 
and increase security cooperation. 
The European Union continues to be a regional organization under scrutiny 
because of its vast expansions that include states of similar and diverse backgrounds.  
While all advancements in security cooperation among member states could have 
potentially occurred independent from the European Union growth, it arguably enhanced 
the level of security cooperation and it is apparent that there is a positive correlation 
between growth and security cooperation within the European Union.  When analyzed in 
relation to the factors developed from the working definition of security cooperation for 
the purpose of this chapter the European Union has experienced moderate growth in 









Chapter 2:  Intelligence Sharing within the European Union and NATO 
 
In an ever more connected world the ability to share accurate and timely 
intelligence amongst nations is imperative in dealing effectively with many of the 
security threats that nations currently face, notably terrorism.  The aim of this chapter is 
to examine what factors contribute to the differences in intelligence sharing within the 
European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  These two 
organizations have enough in common to bear comparison, yet vary sufficiently to 
exemplify how different factors affect intelligence sharing within organizations.  First, 
this chapter will address what intelligence is and identify four potential factors that affect 
intelligence sharing within international organizations.  Those factors are: actors and 
relationships, the degree of trust among states, institutions and the infrastructure available 
to facilitate secure intelligence sharing within the organization.  Each factor will be 
addressed from a theoretical standpoint and will be supplemented with examples of the 
positive and negative effects it has on intelligence sharing.  Subsequently, this chapter 
will use these factors to explore their impact on intelligence sharing within the EU and 
NATO.  Finally, this chapter will attempt to show that intelligence sharing with the EU 
and NATO is vastly different and offer recommendations drawn from the NATO 
examples to minimize these differences and ultimately increase intelligence sharing 
within the EU. 
 
Literature Review 
In order to identify and explore the factors that affect intelligence sharing it is 
necessary to define intelligence. This chapter will use the Department of Defense 
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definition of intelligence as, “information and knowledge about an adversary obtained 
through observation, investigation, analysis or understanding.”65  Intelligence can be 
obtained through a number of collection techniques including:  human intelligence 
(HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery Intelligence (IMINT), measurement 
and signature intelligence (MASINT), geospatial intelligence and open source 
intelligence (OSINT).66   
For centuries states around the world have collected intelligence in order to 
identify threats and assist decision makers in the formulation of any necessary decisions 
to eliminate or mitigate threats.67  The twenty first century has marked a significant shift 
in threats around the world.  Collectively, states have seen the decline of traditional 
military threats and the rise of hostile actors that are not always easily distinguishable.68 
The most plausible way to mitigate the effects of these new actors is to obtain a full and 
comprehensive picture of the threats that they pose.  While some states engage in 
intelligence sharing within international and regional organizations to develop a 
comprehensive picture of threats, others continue to only take into account those 
activities occurring within their geographical and functional remit.69   
Current literature suggests that there are four factors that affect intelligence 
sharing amongst states within regional and international organizations. 
 
 
65 Hunter, Thomas B,  “The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing,”  Operational Studies,  December 2004,  
http://www.operationalstudies.com/terrorism/TerrorismIntelligencePaper2.pdf. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Muller-Wille, Bjorn,  “For Our Eyes Only?  Shaping an Intelligence Community within the EU,”  The 






                                                          
Actors and Relationships 
 The first and arguably most important combination of factors that have the ability 
to affect intelligence sharing within regional and international organizations are the 
member states of the organizations and the relationships among those, as well as their 
relationships with outside actors. By nature, states have differing motivations and needs 
that affect the relationships they choose to pursue both with members of regional and 
international organizations and non-members.70  Organizations that have member states 
engaged in hierarchical agreements tend to enjoy more successful intelligence sharing, 
marked by a high degree of interactions sharing substantial intelligence on a number of 
subject areas.71  Hierarchical agreements to share intelligence contribute to successful 
intelligence sharing because they contain a dominant state that monitors and manages the 
subordinate states intelligence collection and analysis.72  These agreements allow for an 
increased level of intelligence sharing of substantial information because they allow the 
dominant states to monitor subordinate states compliance with the intelligence sharing 
agreement, and subsequently build a high degree of trust by limiting the fear of defection 
and misuse of intelligence.73  Conversely, a state engaged in a hierarchical relationship 
with states outside of an organization will share intelligence at a decreased level if it fears 
that sharing intelligence with member states will spoil “privileged relationships” with the 
outside member states.74  
70 Hunter, Thomas B,  “The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing,”  Operational Studies,  December 2004,  
http://www.operationalstudies.com/terrorism/TerrorismIntelligencePaper2.pdf. 
71 James Walsh, “Defection and Hierarchy in International Intelligence Sharing,” Journal of Public Policy 
27 (2007): 151-181. 
72 Ibid, 151. 
73 Ibid, 151. 
74 Villadsen, Ole R,  “Prospects for a European Common Intelligence Policy,”  
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol44no3/pdf/v44i3a07p.pdf   
(accessed September 25, 2012). 
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Trust 
Another factor is the level of trust that sending states have in the receiving states 
ability and desire to safeguard intelligence.  Scholars have examined the impact of trust 
on intelligence sharing on three different levels.  
The first level focuses on the trust that the receiving state will safeguard the 
sources of intelligence.75   If a sending state has a low degree of trust in the ability of a 
potential receiving state to secure intelligence sent to it and thus possibly compromising 
the security of the sending states intelligence sources, intelligence sharing will occur at a 
minimal or non-existent level.  Conversely, if a sending state has a high degree of trust in 
the ability of the potential receiving state to secure intelligence; intelligence sharing has 
the potential to occur at a more substantial level. 
The second focuses on the trust that the receiving state will safeguard the raw 
intelligence provided to the receiving state.  Thomas Hunter calls attention to this 
relationship when he writes that, “Once a piece of intelligence leaves the hands of a 
providing state, there are no guarantees that it will be used responsibly and in 
confidence.”76  If there is little or no established trust between sending and receiving 
states, the likelihood or perception of likelihood that a receiving state could misuse or 
compromise the intelligence is high, and thus proves to be a barrier in intelligence 
sharing.   
Finally, the third centers on the trust that the sending state will not provide false 
intelligence and the receiving state will not manipulate the original intelligence in order 
75 Muller-Wille, Bjorn,  “For Our Eyes Only?  Shaping an Intelligence Community within the EU,”  The 
European Union Institute for Security Studies,  January 2004, 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ50.pdf. 




                                                          
to misinform and influence other states.77  Examples throughout history provide insight 
into how the degree of trust between sending and receiving states has played on the 
exchange of intelligence amongst states. 
An example where a low degree of trust in the receiving state to safeguard the 
original intelligence hindered intelligence sharing involves the United States and 
Pakistan.  In this case, the United States is hesitant to supply the Pakistani Directorate of 
Inter-Services Intelligence with any valuable intelligence because reports have surfaced 
that elements within the ISI may be sympathetic to Al-Qaida.78  If the United States were 
to share intelligence with the ISI, the potential for compromise of the intelligence would 
be high, which results in a low degree of trust, and ultimately hinders intelligence sharing 
between these two states.  
While it is apparent that trust plays a vital role in intelligence sharing, it is often 
hard to identify the level of trust among member states of international organizations.  
For the purposes of this chapter, two indirect strategies will be employed to gauge the 
level of trust among member states of regional and international organizations.  The first 
strategy will be to examine the rules governing intelligence sharing in various institutions 
and the degree to which institutions within the organization contain monitoring and 
punishment provisions.79  Arguably, if institutions within the organization contain these 
rules, sharing states have a higher likelihood of overcoming mistrust among receiving 
states, and thus sharing higher levels of more substantial intelligence.  The second 
indicator that will be examined to gauge the level of trust among member states of 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid, 6. 




                                                          
international organizations will be to examine public comments made by policy makers 
of member states.80 
 
Institutions  
 Closely tied to the development of trust is the role that international institutions 
and agreements play in facilitating intelligence sharing among member states of 
international organizations.  Research throughout the international relations field of 
studies has shown that international institutions help states overcome mistrust and engage 
in mutually beneficial cooperation, including in the intelligence sharing realm.81  
Institutions encourage cooperation between states through two types of mechanisms.82  
 First, institutions “increase the costs of reneging on an agreement.”83  
International institutions typically clearly define what actions encompass defection and 
compliance, while identifying what actions can be taken by states that may be harmed if 
other member states defect.  Additionally, institutions cultivate trust among member 
states of international organizations by “creating specific allowances for states to monitor 
each other’s compliance with agreements.”84  By providing states the ability to monitor 
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Infrastructure and Resources 
 Finally, as the world has experienced a vast increase in technological capabilities, 
a growing number of scholars have turned their focus to examining the impact of 
infrastructure on intelligence sharing among states.  There are a number of variables that 
are examined in conjunction with the roles infrastructure and resources play on 
intelligence sharing.   
Ole Villadsen, a Walter L. Pforzheimer Award Winner has called attention to a 
number of these variables which include both the physical infrastructure which houses 
and processes intelligence stored in cyberspace as well as the flow of intelligence through 
various infrastructure components.   
Villadsen notes that one way to facilitate successful intelligence sharing among 
member states of regional and international organizations is through the creation of safe 
and capable intranet systems which would allow for rapid dissemination of intelligence to 
member states of organizations.85  Mr. Villadsen argues that the creation of centralized 
intranet systems would facilitate intelligence sharing because it would streamline 
dissemination of intelligence among member states.86  A streamlined dissemination 
process would arguably decrease the vulnerability of the intelligence and facilitate a 
greater degree of intelligence sharing by limiting the amount of individuals, groups and 
locations the intelligence would have to travel through.  
 While an accurate calculation of the level of intelligence sharing occurring among 
member states of regional and international organizations is hard to achieve due to the 
85 Villadsen, Ole R,  “Prospects for a European Common Intelligence Policy,”  
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol44no3/pdf/v44i3a07p.pdf   




                                                          
lack of available data because of the sensitivity and secrecy of the information, 
conclusions can be drawn by examining the actors involved in and the relationships 
created among member states, the level of trust among states, the institutions in place to 
facilitate intelligence sharing and the infrastructure and resources designated to 
intelligence sharing.  When examined against these four factors it becomes apparent that 
the member states of the European Union have experienced less substantial intelligence 
sharing as compared to the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.   
 
Methodology 
Qualitative research collection techniques will be used to gather relevant data on 
the four factors identified as affecting intelligence sharing which will be employed to 
accurately gauge the rate and success of intelligence sharing occurring within the EU and 
NATO.   
 The nature of relationships occurring within the EU and NATO will be the first 
factor examined.   Theory suggests that hierarchical agreements facilitating intelligence 
sharing will indicate successful intelligence sharing, while a lack of hierarchical 
agreements will result in an indication of unsuccessful or limited levels of intelligence 
sharing.   
While it is apparent that trust plays a vital role in intelligence sharing, it is often 
hard to identify the level of trust among member states of international organizations.  
Two indirect strategies will be employed to gauge the level of trust among member states 
of regional and international organizations.  The first will be to examine the rules 
governing intelligence sharing in various institutions and the degree to which institutions 
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within the organization contain monitoring and punishment provisions. If institutions 
within the organization contain these rules, sharing states have a higher likelihood of 
overcoming mistrust among receiving states, and thus sharing higher levels of more 
substantial intelligence.  The second indicator will be to examine public comments made 
by policy makers of member states. 
Quantitative and qualitative data provided by both organizations will be used to 
examine the number of institutions currently facilitating intelligence sharing, level of full 
participation of member states and the rules governing the dissemination of intelligence 
among member states, when available.   
Finally, infrastructure affecting intelligence sharing will be centered on the 
presence of intranets capable of facilitating a greater level of intelligence sharing at a 
higher rate.  If an intranet system is non-existent the level of discussion and development 
of a future intranet system will be examined to determine the level of influence on 
intelligence sharing.  
 
European Union (EU) Case Study:  Actors and Relationship 
The European Union has experienced continued membership growth over the past 
60 years.  The predecessor of the EU, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
was established in 1951 by:  Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxemborg, and the 
Netherlands.87  Since then there have been three major enlargements.  On January 1, 
1973 the ECSC added three new member states, including:  Denmark, Ireland, and the 
87  “The History of the European Union,”  European Union, http://www.europa.eu/about-eu/eu-
history/index_en.htm (accessed November 18, 2012). 
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United Kingdom.88  In 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the newly established 
European Union, and in 2004 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined the existing member states of the 
European Union.89   
Throughout the growth of the ECSC and subsequent EU, no member state has 
been able to assert itself as the dominant state in negotiating and managing a more 
cohesive and centralized intelligence effort among member states.90  Due to the absence 
of a dominant state willing to establish a more concerted intelligence cooperation effort, 
hierarchical relationships in conjunction with intelligence sharing initiatives are lacking 
among EU member states. 
 Additionally one of the most dominant states within the EU, Great Britain, is 
engaged in a hierarchical relationship with the United States.  Great Britain depends on 
the intelligence supplied by the United States.  This dependence tends to make British 
policy makers wary about the kind of intelligence they are willing to share and the 
frequency they are willing to share with EU member states because they do not want to 
disrupt the supply of intelligence from the United States.91  
 
European Union Case Study: Trust 
 The second factor that indicates the level of intelligence sharing occurring among 
member states of the European Union is the degree of trust observed through examination 
of the rules governing intelligence sharing in various EU institutions as well as the public 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 





                                                          
comments made by policy makers and public officials of the member states of the 
European Union. 
 Currently, no European Union institution contains rules that require member 
states to share intelligence with one another, thus making the decision to share 
intelligence a voluntary act.92  There are numerous difficulties that are commonly 
associated with voluntary sharing of intelligence among member states of organizations.  
First, voluntary sharing means that there is no direct way for receiving states to ensure 
that a sharing state has disclosed all relevant intelligence.93  Secondly, there is no way for 
receiving states to determine that the intelligence that has been shared has not been 
modified or distorted in such a way that it could serve the interests of the sending state.94  
Finally, because the European Union institutions allow member states to voluntarily 
contribute intelligence, they all lack strong and effective mechanisms for monitoring and 
punishing member states for failure to disseminate relevant intelligence.95 Through the 
examination of the rules governing intelligence sharing within the European Union it 
becomes apparent that the level of trust created and maintained across member states of 
the European Union is low due to the lack of intelligence sharing requirements and the 
necessary mechanisms to monitor and punish member states that may fail to provide, 
alter or distort intelligence. 
 The second component that indicates the level of trust demonstrated among 
member states of the EU are public comments made by officials.  Throughout the EU the 
92 James Walsh, “Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union:  Institutions Are Not Enough,” JCMS 44 
(2006): 625-643. 
93 Ibid, 636. 
94 Ibid, 636.  




                                                          
comments made across the organization “regularly express concern that sharing is not as 
open as possible” and often identify “mistrust as the key barrier to greater sharing.”96  
There have been two occasions that have been marked by a surge in public comments 
made by public officials and policy makers:  the September 11th attacks and the terrorist 
attacks in Madrid. 
  After the terrorist attacks of September 11th, in a declaration that would not have 
been necessary had the member states believed intelligence sharing was occurring at an 
acceptable level, the European Council concluded that, “Member States will share with 
Europol, systematically and without delay, all useful data regarding terrorism.”97  This 
sentiment was echoed on two different occasions by then British Home Secretary David 
Plunkett and the European Police Office’s (Europol) Director, Jürgen Storbeck.  Shortly 
after the terrorist attacks on the United States Jürgen Storbeck complained, “That each 
Member State was still ‘keeping’ its information ‘to itself’ instead of sharing it with 
others.”98  Additionally, David Plunkett acknowledged the need for more open 
intelligence sharing, while recognizing that, “Britain would not share its most sensitive 
intelligence,” primarily singles intelligence, with other member states.99 
A resurgence of public comments calling for greater intelligence cooperation, 
while acknowledging the limits of intelligence sharing due to mistrust among member 
states occurred after the 2004 terrorist attacks on Madrid.  Nicholas Sarkozy recognized 
that while increased intelligence cooperation would be helpful in preventing future 
terrorist attacks, such “EU intelligence capabilities would be difficult because of the need 
96 James Walsh, “Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union:  Institutions Are Not Enough,” JCMS 44 
(2006): 625-643. 
97 Ibid, 637. 
98 Ibid, 637. 
99 Ibid, 637. 
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felt by each Member State to protect its sources.”100  Belgian Justice Minister Laurette 
Onkelinx criticized the informal intelligence sharing systems established within the EU 
and stated that he believed in order to create higher levels of intelligence sharing among 
the member states of the EU formal structures with mandatory requirements to exchange 
intelligence would have to be built, “on foundations of mutual confidence, otherwise 
there will be no sense to it.”101 
  
European Union Case Study: Institutions  
 The European Union has three institutions that are directly and indirectly tied to 
intelligence sharing occurring among the member states of the EU.  The oldest of those 
institutions is the Berne Group. 
 The Berne Group was formed in the 1970’s as a forum for the six EU member 
states to discuss security services.102  Today, the Berne Group is composed of the current 
27 member states of the EU and serves as the principal point of contact for the heads of 
each state’s national security services.103  Although the Berne Group does not require 
individual state representatives to share operational intelligence, the informal forums of 
the group have facilitated moderately successful intelligence sharing to combat terrorism.  
The most notable example that supports this claim was seen in 2001.  Prior to the 
September 11th attacks on the United States, intelligence indicators suggested that Osama 
100 Ibid, 638. 
101 Ibid, 638. 





                                                          
bin Laden was planning multiple bomb attacks throughout Europe.104  The major 
intelligence services in Europe have engaged in successful exchanges of intelligence 
information, which led to a series of “coordinated operations” across Europe.105 The 
operations resulted in the apprehension of eighteen suspects and the uncovering and 
seizure of weapons and chemicals intended to be used for the creation of explosive 
devices.106 
 The second institution that facilitates intelligence sharing is Europol.  Europol 
was established through a convention signed by all member states in 1995 and began 
operations in 1999.  The major objective of Europol is to improve the sharing of 
intelligence on specific subject matters including:  illegal trafficking, illegal immigration, 
terrorism, forgery and cyber crime.107 While all member states are represented in Europol 
by a team of 65 representatives drawn from each national government, Europol still lacks 
a supply of sufficient intelligence from each member state.  The Director of the Belgian 
Federal Police Patrick Zanders stated, “Insufficient supply of intelligence from member 
states made it difficult for Europol to respond effectively to requests for information.”108  
In addition to Europol suffering from a lack of intelligence provided by the member 
states, Europol’s requests for information and dissemination process further impede the 
intelligence sharing capabilities of the institution.  Europol has detailed restrictions on the 
104 Aldrich, Richard J, “Transatlantic Intelligence and Security Cooperation,”  
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/aldrich/publications/inta80_4_08_aldrich.pdf (accessed 
November 10, 2012).   
105 Ibid, 9. 
106 Ibid, 9. 
107 James Walsh,  “Security Policy and Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union,”  April 2009,  
http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2009/papers/walsh_12C.pdf. 




                                                          
accessibility and sharing of analytical files.109  If an analysis is of a “general nature” and 
of a “strategic type” all member states may access the report.110  However, if the 
information “bears on specific cases not concerning all member states and has a direct 
operational aim” only the member states that provided the initial intelligence, member 
states that were invited by the states providing the initial intelligence, and “those which 
are directly concerned by the information” have access to the files.111 
 The final group that indirectly affects intelligence sharing within the European 
Union is the EU Military Staff.  The EU Military Staff’s Intelligence Division is 
composed of roughly 30 staff members who are responsible for collating intelligence 
provided by national authorities, performing additional analysis and providing early 
warnings, producing assessments and operational support on external security matters.112  
There are two major impediments that indicate that the level of intelligence cooperation 
facilitated by the EU Military Staff is minimal.  First, as with the other EU institutions 
related to facilitating intelligence among member states, member states are not required 
to share intelligence with the EU Military Staff.113  Also, because the EU Military Staff’s 
Intelligence Division provides additional analysis on the intelligence provided by the 
member states, potential receiving states are not able to directly identify the country that 
provided the initial information.114  The masking of the identity of the sending state(s) 
has the potential to create a barrier of mistrust among the receiving state(s) for a number 
109 Ibid, 635. 
110 James Walsh,  “Security Policy and Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union,”  April 2009,  
http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2009/papers/walsh_12C.pdf. 
111 James Walsh, “Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union:  Institutions Are Not Enough,” JCMS 44 
(2006): 625-643. 
112 James Walsh,  “Security Policy and Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union,”  April 2009,  
http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2009/papers/walsh_12C.pdf. 
113 James Walsh, “Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union:  Institutions Are Not Enough,” JCMS 44 
(2006): 625-643. 
114 Ibid, 635. 
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of reasons.  First, if the identity of the sending state is masked the receiving state has no 
verification mechanism to directly reach out to the sending state to gain clarity or more 
information.  Additionally, if member states have strained relationships with various 
other states or have received incorrect or misleading intelligence from member states they 
are less likely to completely trust the validity of the information coming from a source 
that isn’t identified, as they cannot verify if that the information is coming from one of 
those states.   
 
European Union Case Study: Infrastructure and Resources 
 Currently, the primary infrastructure to support intelligence sharing through cyber 
intranets within the European Union is the European Computer System (TECS).  This 
system contains two groups of intelligence.115  Both types of intelligence are drawn from 
Europol’s intelligence pool.  The first group of intelligence is held within Europol’s 
Information System and provides basic identifying characteristics, such as names, 
nationality, sex and place of birth, about “individuals and groups suspected of having 
committed, or being likely to commit, a crime” that would fall under Europol’s 
jurisdiction.116  The second group of intelligence is composed of the “work files” 
produced by Europol.117  These files often provide documentation regarding specific 
offenses, including all pertinent case information.   
While this system may facilitate low levels of intelligence sharing there are 
multiple flaws to the current model.  First, the intelligence provided is incomplete 
115 James Walsh,  “Security Policy and Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union,”  April 2009,  
http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2009/papers/walsh_12C.pdf. 
116 Ibid, 9. 
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because member states of the EU voluntarily contribute intelligence, and because of the 
voluntary nature tend to give limited amounts of intelligence both in the scope and depth 
of information.  Second, because both groups of intelligence are products of Europol the 
same restrictions to access apply as previously mentioned.   
 
NATO Case Study:  Actors and Relationship 
 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has a long history of dominant states 
engaging with other member states to form hierarchical relationships in order to better 
facilitate intelligence sharing.  One of the oldest hierarchical relationships that exist 
within NATO is the relationship between the United States and Great Britain.   
 At the beginning of the Cold War the United States understood the necessity to 
have intelligence capabilities close to the Soviet Union.  The United States identified 
Great Britain as a trustworthy partner for this collaboration.  Through the beginning of 
the Cold War, the partnership between the two states was quite successful, and by June 
1948 the United States and the United Kingdom formalized there intelligence relationship 
in a series of understandings known as the UKUSA agreement.118  The UKUSA 
agreement is an arrangement that acknowledges that the intelligence sharing occurring 
between the United States and Great Britain, as well as Australia and Canada, is 
occurring at a higher level than with countries that join later.119  The UKUSA agreements 
also established common procedures and terms, which insured that intelligence sharing 
across the two countries was smooth.   
118 James Walsh, “Defection and Hierarchy in International Intelligence Sharing,” Journal of Public Policy 
27 (2007): 151-181. 
119 Ibid, 174. 
45 
 
                                                          
 Today, NATO is still marked by hierarchical relationships.  Member states 
regularly receive intelligence reports from the dominant states of NATO, which include 
the United States, France, Great Britain and Germany.120  The agreements established 
among the dominant states of NATO, allow for intelligence sharing to occur at high 
levels among the dominant states, as well as facilitating a large degree of intelligence 
sharing occurring between dominant states and the additional member states of NATO. 
 
NATO Case Study:  Trust 
The second factor that has the ability to help or hinder intelligence sharing among 
states is the level of trust that sending states and receiving states have within each other.  
NATO member states enjoy a high level of trust built on confidence from continued 
successful intelligence cooperation efforts throughout history.121  There have been and 
continue to be multiple alliances among and involving a large number of NATO member 
states that indicate a high degree of trust based on the degree of intelligence sharing that 
is occurring.  
 One of the earliest alliances that have been recognized is “CAZAB”.122  
“CAZAB” was a security alliance developed in the 1960’s among English-speaking 
states.  “CAZAB” was established to search for evidence of high-level soviet penetration 
120 “Situation Center,”  North Atlantic Treaty Organization,  
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-C9EA078F-3BB01793/natolive/topics_57954.htm (accessed October 20, 
2012). 
121 Aldrich, Richard J, “Transatlantic Intelligence and Security Cooperation,”  
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November 10, 2012).   
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among the states.123  Intelligence cooperation was further enhanced in the 1970’s when a 
larger group of states began an intelligence-sharing system on terrorism in the Middle-
East.124  That system was known as “Kilowatt”.  Kilowatt was an intelligence forum 
formed in response to a number of terrorist coups that occurred in the 1970’s and 
included intelligence service representatives from:  Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and Israel.125  The 
multilateral intelligence framework of Kilowatt allowed the states involved to advance 
intelligence sharing on Middle-Eastern terrorism.126  While it is evident there is a high 
degree of trust established on confidence built upon frequent, successful interactions, 
specific comments made by top officials within the United States indicate the level of 
intelligence sharing occurring among member states of NATO has not reached its full 
potential.   
Comments regarding NATO’s fragmented response to the 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
made by then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld exemplify this belief.  In his 
comments he identified NATO’s lack of common intelligence as a contributing factor to 
the fragmented response in Iraq.127  He continued on to say: 
 
“To the extent we are all working off the same set of facts, or roughly the same 
set of facts, the people from our respective countries tend to come to roughly the 
same set of facts, the people from our respective countries tend to come to 
123 Ibid, 8. 
124 Ibid, 8. 
125 Shpiro, Shlomo, “The Communication of Mutual Security:  Frameworks for European-Mediterranean 
Intelligence Sharing,” NATO 2001, http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/shpiro.pdf. 
126 Ibid, 8. 
127 Ibid, 19. 
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roughly the same conclusions, and to the extent we’re not working off the same 
set of facts, we tend not to; and it seems to me that it may very well be that one 
thing NATO might do would be to do a better job of seeing that the intelligence 
capabilities of the respective countries are brought together and that the people in 
NATO and the capitals of NATO countries are kept tuned into those threats and 
the kinds of capabilities that we as free people face.  We’re much more likely to 
get a faster common understanding to the extend we have a reasonably similar 
perspective with respect to what the facts are.”128 
 
This discourse is important for two reasons.  First, it shows that the United States, one of 
the most dominant states within NATO, acknowledges that the intelligence capabilities of 
NATO member states do not always produce common, shared intelligence.  This quote 
exhibits the fact that current level of intelligence sharing among NATO states is not 
adequate.  Also, Donald Rumsfeld concludes with a call to action of all NATO member 
states to increase intelligence sharing capabilities in order to obtain a “common 
understanding” and ultimately identify and respond to threats around the world. 
  
NATO Case Study:  Institutions 
 NATO has three primary institutions responsible for the collection and 
dissemination of intelligence among member states. 
128 Ibid, 20. 
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 The first, and one of the oldest intelligence exchange organizations, is the NATO 
Special Committee known as AC-46, established on December 3, 1952.129  The AC-46 is 
composed of the heads of intelligence services of all NATO member countries, each of 
whom represents their country’s intelligence community within NATO.130  The primary 
mission of AC-46 is to advise the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on “espionage, terrorist 
and other non-military related threats,” which have the ability to affect NATO as a whole, 
and each of its member states.131 
 The second institution that facilitates intelligence sharing among NATO member 
states is the Situation Center (SitCen).  The Situation Center was established in 1969 to 
ensure the continuous flow and exchange of information among member states.132  
Today, the Situation Center is a 24/7 operation responsible for “receiving, exchanging, 
and disseminating political, economic and military intelligence and information” 
throughout NATO headquarters, strategic commands and alliance members.133  
 The final group that directly contributes to the success of intelligence cooperation 
among NATO member states is the NATO special committee.  The Special Committee is 
an analytical unit located within NATO that compiles and analyzes intelligence provided 
by member states security services regarding terrorism.134  The Special Committee also 
closely cooperates with NATO military intelligence bodies to obtain and analyze 
129 Ibid, 17. 
130 Ibid, 17. 
131 Ibid, 17. 
132 Nobile, Giuseppe, Virginia Estevez, and Stergios Pinakas,  “NATO Headquarters-The Situation Center 
GIS Experience,” http://proceedings.esri.com/library/userconf/proc06/papers/papers/pap_ 
2341.pdf. 
133 “Situation Center,”  North Atlantic Treaty Organization,  
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available intelligence being provided by the member states.  Once the Special Committee 
has analyzed the available data, it is the disseminated to the Council and Secretary 
General.135 
 
NATO Case Study:  Infrastructure and Resources 
 NATO is actively advancing its cyber infrastructure to enhance intelligence 
sharing among alliance states.  NATO’s first effort to advance the infrastructure to 
support intelligence sharing was through the creation of the NATO Consultation, 
Command and Control Agency.  The Consultation, Command and Control Agency is 
comprised of 800 staff members and among other things is responsible for dealing with 
the integration of data from a variety of non-standard systems that span through the 
alliance states.136   
 Additionally, NATO is utilizing a “push-pull” information sharing strategy.137  
This information sharing approach allows information to be “pulled” or collected from 
operational areas and “pushed” or disseminated to alliance member states.138  This 
information is easily circulated across NATO’s interconnected cyber network in XML 
format.139  XML format allows for information collected among states to be consolidated 
135 Ibid, 17. 
136 Ibid, 19. 
137 Nobile, Giuseppe, Virginia Estevez, and Stergios Pinakas,  “NATO Headquarters-The Situation Center 
GIS Experience,” http://proceedings.esri.com/library/userconf/proc06/papers/papers/pap_ 
2341.pdf. 
138 Ibid, 1. 
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into a “platform and language neutral” field, which lends itself to quick and easy 
dissemination across different states.140 
Conclusion 
 After examining the four factors that affect intelligence sharing within the 
European Union and NATO, it is apparent that the hypothesis of this chapter, that NATO 
member states are currently engaged in more frequent and substantial intelligence sharing 
is correct for the following reasons.  
 First, the European Union lacks a dominant state able to create hierarchical 
agreements within the EU.  The lack of hierarchical agreements due to the absence of a 
dominant state limits intelligence sharing.  Additionally, the states within the European 
Union, especially Great Britain, are engaged in hierarchical relationships with states 
outside of the EU organization which further diminishes intelligence sharing with 
member states within the EU.  Conversely, the member states within NATO enjoy a 
number of established hierarchical relationships which contributes to successful 
intelligence sharing within the organization. 
 Secondly, both organizations lack formal rules that require member states to share 
intelligence with one another.  The lack of formal rules governing intelligence sharing 
hamper the likelihood of intelligence sharing because there is not a mechanism which 
would allow sending states to monitor and punish receiving states within the organization 
that misuse the shared intelligence, thus limiting the amount of trust in one another.  
Additionally, officials from both member states within both organizations have made 
public comments calling for a greater level of intelligence sharing to occur. 
140 Ibid, 3. 
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 At an institutional level, the European Union and NATO both have three primary 
institutions that are designed to facilitate intelligence sharing.  The EU institutions are 
marred by the voluntary and often limited participation of the member states providing 
intelligence.  Without full participation, the intelligence gathered is often incomplete, 
thus limiting the quantity and quality available for member states.  Coupled with 
incomplete intelligence, the dissemination process within Europol is restrictive and does 
not allow for intelligence to be readily available for member states.  Alternatively, the 
institutions within NATO, which have been designed to facilitate intelligence sharing, 
enjoy substantial participation from member states and have staffs dedicated to ensuring 
the successful collection and dissemination of intelligence to member states. 
Finally, the primary infrastructure to support intelligence sharing through cyber 
intranets within the European Union, TECS, contains multiple flaws including:  
incomplete intelligence and restrictions limiting the dissemination of intelligence as 
imposed by Europol.  In contrast, NATO has created the NATO Consultation, Command 
and Control agency to facilitate the integration of data from a variety of non-standard 
operating systems throughout the alliance states, as well as utilize a “push-pull” 
information sharing strategy.   
While neither organization has achieved a level of complete, flawless intelligence 
sharing, there are a number of adjustments that the European Union could make in order 
to increase the level of intelligence sharing occurring among member states.  First, and 
foremost an EU member state, or group of states, must step forward and establish itself as 
the dominant state of the organization.  This is imperative because as seen throughout the 
NATO example, the primary driving force of intelligence sharing within the organization 
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is the hierarchical structure of the relationships which contribute to successful 
intelligence sharing because they allow the dominant state to monitor subordinate states 
compliance with intelligence sharing. At an institutional level, the European Union needs 
to build trust amongst its member states in order to facilitate a more quantitative and 
qualitative level of intelligence sharing.  Coupled with this, the European Union needs to 
ease current restrictions on the dissemination of intelligence among member states 
through EU institutions.  Also,  the European Union needs to update its intranet databases 
to allow for a “push-pull” strategy.  This strategy allows for intelligence to be “pushed” 
into databases, as well as for member states to easily “pull” out intelligence when needed.  
Intelligence sharing will always be dominated by the level of trust experienced among the 
members of any organization; however by adapting organizational institutions and 
infrastructure to greater facilitate intelligence sharing regional and international 











Chapter 3:  Economic Crisis and Security Cooperation within the European Union 
 Throughout history the rise of threats and subsequent rise of state powers and 
various alliances to quell those threats has been a constant phenomenon.  In a world that 
has never been more connected security cooperation among states has once again become 
a paramount issue.  The objective of this chapter is to determine how the economic crisis 
within the European Union has affected security cooperation among members, 
particularly Greece, Spain, and Portugal.  To reach that objective this chapter will survey 
four slightly varied definitions of collective security as presented by two former and two 
current scholars in the field including:  George Schwarzenberger, Vernon Van Dyke, 
A.K. Chaturvedi, and Onyemaechi Eke.  It will then present the four principles that 
collective security is comprised of as presented by Rourke and Boyer.  Once a framework 
of collective security is established three case studies examining the political will and 
public support for security cooperation within Greece, Spain, and Portugal will be 
presented.  These case studies will highlight the specific environment of each country’s 
economic crisis, bailout stipulations, defense spending prior to, during, and after the 
financial crisis, and spending on social programs within the country.  Through 
examination of the previously mentioned indicators this chapter will show that security 
cooperation within the European Union, particularly within these three countries, was not 
adversely affected by the economic crisis. 
Literature Review 
 Prior to exploring the implications of the economic crisis on security cooperation 
within the European Union by examining specific case studies, it is essential to explore 
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the notion of collective security.  For the purposes of this chapter four definitions will be 
provided and analyzed drawing from two scholars prior to the end of the Cold War and 
two current international relations scholars. 
 George Schwarzenberger, a prolific and well published author on international 
issues, in Power Politics:  A Study of International Society Schwarzenberger defined 
collective security as “machinery for joint action in order to prevent or counter any attack 
against an established international order”.141  Vernon Van Dyke, a political science 
scholar and professor of the mid 1900’s, offers a similar but slightly different definition 
of collective security.  Van Dyke defines collective security as a “system in which a 
number of states are bound to engage in collective efforts on behalf of each other’s 
individual security”.142  While both definitions are reasonably similar, they do vary 
slightly.  The first and arguably most obvious difference between the two definitions is 
that Van Dyke explicitly states that collective security is a system of states, whereas 
Schwarzenberger does not.  Additionally, Schwarzenberger implies that collective 
security is a measure that should be used to deter or fight any attack against the 
international order as a whole, as compared to Van Dyke who offers a narrower approach 
asserting that states should partake in collective security if an individual state’s security is 
being threatened or breached.  While these scholars provide varying definitions of 
collective security both affirm that collective security encompasses a group of players 
that pool resources to defend the status quo. 
141 Schwarzenberger, George.  Power Politics:  A Study of International Society (3rd Edition).   London, 
1964. 
142 Van Dyke, Vernon.  International Politics.  New York:  Meredith Corporation, 1957. 
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 Like the scholars that were writing prior to the end of the Cold War, A.K. 
Chaturvedi, a retired Army Colonel, and Onyemaechi Eke, an African scholar in the field 
of international relations, provide definitions of collective security similar to their 
predecessors.  A.K. Chaturvedi, in Dictionary of Political Science, defines collective 
security as “an arrangement arrived at by some nations to protect their vital interest, 
safety or integrity, against a probable threat or menace over a particular period, by means 
of combining their power”.143  Eke presents a definition of the term that he identifies as 
“an idealist one which hinges on the prevention of hostilities by the formation of an 
overwhelming military force by member states to deter aggression or, by implication, to 
launch a reprisal attack capable of defeating the recalcitrant member”.144  Similar to Van 
Dyke, both Chaturvedi and Eke identify that collective security is composed of a group of 
states; however, Eke was the only scholar the explicitly stated that collective security is 
comprised of a military force. 
 While all four scholars offered an array of interpretations on the definition of 
collective security, after examining each description of the term it can be concluded that 
all four authors identified that collective security is a group of actors that generally 
renounce the use of force against one another and vow to defend one another against an 
outside threat.  Although the precise definition of collective security is not entirely agreed 
upon amongst predominant international relations scholars; literature suggests that there 
are four principles that are necessary for collective security to be achieved.  
 
143 Chaturvedi, A.K.  Dictionary of Political Science.  New Delhi:  Academic Publishers, 2006. 
144 Eke, Onyemaechi.  Strategic Studies:  Logical Focus in the 21st Century.  Abakaliki:  Willy-Rose and 
Appleseed Publishing, 2007. 
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Four Principles of Collective Security 
 The first principle of collective security is:  all countries renounce the use of 
force, except in self-defense.  The primary purpose of this principle is to ensure trust 
among states engaged in a collective security group from internal attacks initiated by 
other collective security group states.  The second principle of collective security is:  all 
states agree that peace is of the utmost importance.  The essence of this second principle 
is that an attack on one state of the collective is an attack on all.  The third principle of 
collective security is:  all pledge to join to stop an act of aggression and restore peace. It 
is within this principle that collective security agreements tend to falter as many countries 
are unwilling to overlook their sovereign interest to pursue collective action.145  Rourke 
and Boyer highlight this fact in World Politics:  International Politics on the World Stage 
stating, “thus far governments have generally maintained their right to view conflict in 
terms of their national interest and to support or oppose actions based on their 
nationalistic point of view”.146  The fourth, and final principle of collective security, is 
that actors involved in the collective must supply material and personnel resources 
necessary to form a formidable force able to address and counter any attacks.147  It is 
within this fourth principle of security cooperation that a number of issues arrive.  First, 
based on the size and economic situation of the states involved smaller, less economically 
successful states may not be able to contribute the same amount of material and/or 
personnel resources.  This could contribute to an unsuccessful collective due to not 
having the raw materials needed to thwart an attack.  Additionally, this could contribute 
145 Rourke, J.  and M. Boyer.  World Politics:  International Politics on the World Stage, Brief.  U.S.A.:  





                                                          
to a lack of full participation and trust by other actors within the collective who have 
agreed to relinquish some sovereignty in order to participate within the collective. 
While a completely accurate account of security cooperation among member 
states within the European Union after the economic crisis will be difficult to determine, 
conclusions can be drawn by examining the specific attributes of each state’s financial 
crisis, bailout stipulations, defense spending prior to, during, and after the economic 
crisis, and the public support for participation in collective security. 
Methodology 
Qualitative and quantitative research collection techniques will be used to gather 
relevant data to support or negate the hypothesis that the economic crisis within the 
European Union did not have an adverse affect on security cooperation particularly in 
Greece, Spain, and Portugal. 
The particulars of the financial crisis within each country will be the first 
information provided.  This section will include specifics of the financial crisis including, 
but not limited to:  the factors contributing to the crisis as well as bailout stipulations.  
The purpose of this section is to examine qualitative data to extrapolate if the bailout 
stipulations had an impact on the political will of the state to contribute to the theory of 
“pooling and sharing” as outlined by the European Union after the economic crisis. 
After building a fundamental understanding of the facts of the economic crisis 
within each country and individual bailout stipulations, quantitative data highlighting the 
defense contributions to the European Union, including total defense expenditures, will 
be presented prior to, during, and after the economic crisis, spanning form 2005-2012.  
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This quantitative data will supply another aspect to consider when determining the impact 
of the economic crisis on the political will of the state to contribute to security 
cooperation within the European Union. 
The final pillar of examination will look at the perception of public support for 
security cooperation within the European Union.  Quantitative data will be presented 
highlighting spending on social programs as compared to the defense spending over the 
span of the same time frame.  The implication of examining defense spending as it 
compares to social program spending throughout the economic crisis will stand to 
highlight if public support has increased or diminished to contribute to security 
cooperation among the member states of the European Union. 
Greece:  Financial Crisis 
 The financial crisis in Greece can be attributed to a combination of overspending 
and a decline in state income.  In the ten years leading up the financial crisis of 2008, 
public sector wages rose nearly fifty percent, a trend that was much higher than that of 
other Eurozone countries.  Additionally, the government also acquired a large amount of 
debt while paying for the 2004 Athens Olympics.  Although overspending was a large 
problem for Greece, it was even further compounded by extensive tax evasion throughout 
the country which greatly limited the government’s income.  Ultimately, after years of 
overspending and a steady decline in income, Greece was no longer able to repay their 
loans, and was forced to ask for help from other European partners and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). 
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 To date, the European Union and the IMF have provided two bailout loans to 
Greece totaling roughly 240 billion Euros.148  Coupled with the multi-stage loans 
provided by the EU and the IMF, the majority of Greece’s private-sector creditors agreed 
to write off approximately seventy five percent of the debts owed to them by Athens, as 
well as replace existing loans with new loans at a lower interest rate.149  In exchange for 
the bailouts provided, the EU and the IMF required that Greece implement major 
austerity measures involving extreme spending cuts, increases in taxes, and labor market 
and pension reforms.  As of 2014, reports still forecast Greek debt at roughly 177 percent 
of gross domestic product (GDP).150  While the country has managed to improve price 
competitiveness by forcing once souring wages down, adhere to reforms implemented 
within the bailout stipulations specifically reducing the government work force by twenty 
percent, and improve tax collection by modernizing and enforcing tax procedures, Greece 
still has an unemployment rate of nearly 27 percent and the nation’s privatization 
program has not been nearly successful as previously forecasted.151 
 Although Greece has managed to make some progress after the financial crisis 
and subsequent bailout the current extended projection for the country still remains rather 
bleak, with debt ratios staying quite high for an extended period of time and economic 
growth remaining quite dismal.   
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Greece:  Defense Spending 
 Total defense expenditures in Greece have not indicated a pattern that shows a 
direct correlation with the economic crisis within the country.  From 2005-2009 Greece’s 
gross defense expenditures steadily increased.  In 2005, defense expenditures totaled 
4956 million Euros representing 2.75% of GDP.152  In 2006 total defense expenditures 
rose to 5240 million Euros, but the percentage of GDP dipped slightly to 2.68%.153  The 
following year total defense expenditures once again increased to 5579 million Euros, or 
2.44% of GDP.154  In 2008, the same year as the financial crisis, defense expenditures 
peaked at 6192 million Euros, 2.55% of GDP.155  After 2008, total defense expenditures 
have been on a downward trend, barring 2011 where there was a spike in total defense 
spending.  In 2009, defense expenditures lowered only slightly from the previous year 
and totaled 6023 million Euros, 2.54% of GDP.156  The following year, 2010, defense 
expenditures dropped a significant amount to 4756 million Euros, representing 2.07% of 
GDP.157  In 2011, defense expenditures increased once again to levels that were seen 
prior to the financial crisis, and totaled 5477 million Euros, or 2.63% of GDP.158  Finally, 
in 2012 defense expenditures reached their lowest point over the previous seven years 
and fell to only 3272 million Euros, or 1.69% of GDP.159 
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 The examination of total defense expenditures for Greece from 2005-2012 
suggest that defense spending has been affected by the economic crisis of 2008.  It 
appears as though defense spending spiked just prior to the economic crisis and then 
continued to decline, barring spending in 2011 that was marked by a significant increase 
in defense spending.  The defense expenditure data above indicates that the political will 
of the state to contribute to defense budgets was affected by the economic crisis and 
subsequent bailout austerity measures.  Additional data for 2013 would provide a more 
accurate picture of the spending trends as there was a downward trend after 2008, with a 
spike in spending in 2011; however, with the current data available it appears as though 
political will to contribute to defense spending has declined. 
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Greece:  Social Program Spending 
 A final point to examine when determining how economic crisis affects security 
cooperation is to examine government social expenditures as a percentage of gross 
domestic product.  This marker can be used to determine the perception of public support 
when it is compared to defense spending trends as outlined in the previous section.   
 From 2006-2012 Greece’s total public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
has for the most part steadily increased, with the most significant increase occurring 
between 2008 and 2009, the year of the economic crisis.  In 2006 government social 
spending totaled 21.3% of Greece’s GDP.161  In 2007, that number rose by .3% to 21.6%; 
in 2008 the number rose again to 22.2% of GDP; and in 2009 the number rose by its 
highest margin of 1.7% to 23.9% of GDP.162  From 2009 to 2010 that number fell slightly 
to 23.3% but made a quick recovery and rose by 1.1% in 2011 to 24.4% of GDP.163  In 
2012, once again government spending slightly declined to end 2012 with 24.1% of GDP 
being spent on public social expenditures.164  
While it appears as though defense spending has suffered from the economic 
crisis of 2008, government spending on social expenditures has steadily increased 
throughout the past six years indicating that public support for security cooperation has 
slightly declined since 2005. 
 







                                                          
Spain:  Financial Crisis 
 Unlike the financial crisis in Greece, caused by overspending and a lack of 
income, Spain’s financial crisis was rooted in an immense amount of real-estate debt 
caused by the construction bubble burst.  After joining the European Union in 1986, 
Spain enjoyed a long economic boom supported by a housing bubble that was 
characterized by inexpensive loans to homebuyers and builders, and was marked by a 
44% increase in housing prices from 2004-2008, the years directly proceeding the 
financial crisis.165  During that time banks had been thriving due to the rapid expansion of 
the housing market.  However, in 2008, after twenty two years of a healthy economy the 
housing bubble burst, causing housing prices to plummet and the economy to constrict.  
Additionally, the collapse of the housing market caused the value of the assets the 
construction and housing loans were based on to plummet, equating to borrowers having 
trouble making their loan repayments.  This was further compounded because the banks 
had borrowed the money on international markets to lend to construction companies and 
homebuyers rather than using savings deposits from their customer.166  What this 
essentially meant was that because borrowers could no longer repay their loans due to a 
lack of income, the lenders were stuck with an immense amount of debt owed to players 
on the international market.  In order to deal with this precarious situation the Spanish 
government had to ask for help on the international scene. 
  In conjunction with restructuring the country’s banking sector, in 2012 Madrid 
requested international aid for its banks and was offered the ability to borrow from a loan 
165 “Eurozone Crisis Explained,” BBC News ( accessed July 10, 2014). 
166 Ibid, 2. 
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up to 100 billion Euros drawn from the European Financial Stability Facility and the 
European Stability Mechanism, Eurozone funds set up to help members in financial 
distress.167  By borrowing from funds set aside to help European Union members in 
financial distress, Spain avoided having to borrow from international authorities, such as 
the IMF, which allowed them to avoid austerity measures attached to the loan money.  In 
January 2014, Spain exited its international bailout program having used 56.6 billion 
Euros of the roughly 100 billion Euros offered to them.168  Since restructuring the 
banking sector and accepting aid, Spain’s economy has steadily improved, showing 
growth in the last two quarters of 2013.   
 
Spain:  Defense Spending 
 Spain’s total defense expenditures throughout the seven year span of 2005-2012 
seem to fluctuate in a pattern that represents the financial struggle and subsequent bailout 
of the state.  Prior to the construction bubble burst of 2008 Spain’s total defense 
expenditures steadily rose.  In 2005, defense expenditures were 10500 million Euros, 
1.16% of GDP; in 2006 expenditures rose to 11506 million Euros, 1.8% of GDP; in 2007 
defense spending rose to 12219 million Euros, 1.16% of GDP; and finally in 2008, the 
year of the construction bubble burst, defense expenditures peaked at 12756 million 
Euros, or roughly 1.16% of GDP.169  The year following the construction bubble burst 
the total defense expenditures slipped slightly to 12196 million Euros, still holding steady 
167 Ibid, 3. 
168 Frayer, Lauren, “Spain Exits Bailout Program; Second Eurozone Country to do so,”  The Los Angeles 
Times, World section (accessed August 2014). 
169 “Defense Data Portal,” European Defense Agency, http://www.eda.Europa.eu/info-hub/defence-data-
portal (accessed 15 August 2014). 
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at 1.16% of GDP.170  In 2010 and 2011 the numbers continued their downward trend as 
the country floundered to recover from the construction bubble burst and subsequent 
bank crisis.  In 2010 total defense expenditures dipped to 11132 million Euros, 
representing 1.05% of GDP and the following year spending bottomed out at 10059 
million Euros, the lowest point of spending over the seven year span, comprising just 
.95% of GDP.171  However, defense spending once again increased in 2012, the same 
year that Spain requested international aid from the European community, to 10828 
million Euros, representing 1.03% of GDP.172 







After examining the total defense expenditures for Spain from 2005-2012 it 
becomes clear that defense spending was directly impacted by the financial struggles of 
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the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism, which 
has allowed Spain to recover without implying strict austerity measures on the country.  
The defense expenditure data above indicates that the political will of the state to 
contribute to defense budgets is directly correlated to health of the state, but at the current 
moment seems to be increasing as the economy rebounds from the economic crisis of 
2008.     
 
Spain:  Social Program Spending 
 Total public social expenditures in Greece have seen positive gains throughout the 
time span of 2006-2012 barring a slight loss from 2010 to 2011.  In 2006 government 
social spending represented 21.1% of GDP.174  For the next four years that number 
continued to gain momentum, resulting in social expenditures of 21.3% of GDP in 2007, 
22.9% in 2008, 26% in 2009, and 26.7% of GDP in 2010.175 The largest gain during this 
time frame came between 2008 and 2009, the same time as the construction bubble burst.  
The only loss of social spending came the following year expenditures fell slightly to 
26.4% of GDP.176   In 2012, once again government social spending increased slightly to 
comprise 26.8% of GDP.  
 As compared to defense spending, as presented in the previous section, there 
appears to be an inverse relationship between defense spending and government social 
spending after the 2008 economic crisis.  Between 2008 and 2009 defense spending 






                                                          
decreased slightly while public social expenditures grew 3.1%, the largest increase over 
the five year study, as a percentage of GDP.  Defense spending continued to decline until 
2012 while public social expenditures continued moderate growth, with only one slight 
loss from 2010 to 2011.  This inverse relationship highlights that public support for 
security cooperation was crippled due to the economic crisis, as defense spending 
decreased and government social spending increased. 
 
Portugal:  Financial Crisis  
Portugal has both a financial and economic crisis.  Portugal entered the European 
Union in 1986 and the European Monetary Union in 1999 as a peripheral country, in this 
case a country that was not performing at the same economic level of other European 
Union countries.  Once Portugal joined the European Union external funds became cheap 
and abundant to the country, as creditors had the perception that there was little to no risk 
in providing money to Portugal because they were in the same currency market and had 
no restrictions on capital flows.  The cheap and abundant credit offered by wealthy EU 
member states created an environment that led to swift increase in the country’s standard 
of living.  Concurrently, the Portuguese government struggled to maintain a budget 
deficit under the three percent mandated by the Euro zone’s Stability and Growth Pact.  
In 2005, Portugal’s budget deficit rose above the three percent mandate and landed at 
5.9%.  The following year, the government managed to reduce the deficit by almost two 
percent, mainly by ramping up revenue-generating measures such as tax enforcement and 
collection.  In 2007 and 2008, the budget deficit fell below four percent due to spending 
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cuts and structural reforms.177  However, in 2009 the budget deficit rose to a staggering 
10.1% of GDP, a result of a substantial drop in tax revenue.178  The influx of cheap and 
abundant lines of credit, coupled with a soaring budget deficit were the two driving 
factors behind the financial crisis Portugal experienced.  The problem was further 
compounded by the economic problems within Portugal, primarily overall low 
productivity and lack of competitiveness with other European Union countries. 
On May 3, 2011 the Portuguese government reached a bailout agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank, and the European Commission.  
The agreement resulted in a three year, 78 billion Euro bailout package that requires 
Portugal to implement widespread austerity measures.179  The austerity measures include:  
measures to reform the Portuguese labor market and justice sector, as well as the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises.  Since the approval and implementation of the 
bailout package the Portuguese economy has not seen positive economic growth, 
experiencing a 1.6% contraction in 2011 and a 3.2% contraction in 2012 as a result of 
austerity measures introduced by the bailout package.180  Additionally, the country has 
been experiencing a consistently growing unemployment sector, as well as protests and 
strikes opposing the austerity measures imposed by the bailout package. 
 
 
177 “Background on Countries of the World:  Portugal,” Business Source Complete (2012):  1-5. 
178 Baer, Werner, Daniel A. Dias, and Joao B. Duarte,  “The economy of Portugal and the European Union:  
From high growth prospects to the debt crisis,” The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 53 
(2013):  345-352. 
179 “Background on Countries of the World:  Portugal,” Business Source Complete (2012):  1-5. 
180 Ibid, 2. 
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Portugal:  Defense Spending 
 Defense spending prior to, during, and after the financial and economic crisis and 
subsequent bailout presents an additional indicator as to the political will of the state to 
contribute to defense spending during a time of economic hardship.  Portugal’s total 
defense expenditures throughout the seven year span seem to fluctuate in a pattern that 
seemingly mimics the struggle of the state.  In 2005, total defense expenditure was 2532 
million Euros, or roughly 1.72% of the GDP.181  For the next two years the total defense 
expenditure declined to 2452 million Euros in 2006 or 1.58% of GDP and 2417 million 
Euros in 2007 or 1.48%.182  During this time Portugal was struggling with an inflating 
budget deficit and instituted spending cuts as one way to lessen the swelling deficit.  For 
the next three years, from 2008-2010 the total defense expenditure steadily increased.  In 
2008 the defense expenditure was 2536 million Euros, a number that surpassed the 2005 
numbers and represented 1.53% of GDP.183  In 2009, that number rose to 2671 million 
Euros, 1.63% of GDP. 184 In 2010, the total defense expenditures for Portugal peaked at 
2782 million Euros, 1.61% of GDP.185  During these three years where total defense 
expenditures consistently increased was also the time that Portugal’s budget deficit 
soared to over 10% and a bailout was requested.  From that point Portugal’s defense 
expenditures have steadily declined.  In 2011, total defense expenditures were 2669 
million Euros and in 2012, the first full year under the austerity measures of the bailout 
181 “Defense Data Portal,” European Defense Agency, http://www.eda.Europa.eu/info-hub/defence-data-







                                                          
package the defense expenditures fell to their lowest point over the past seven years and 
landed at 2366 million Euros, only 1.43% of GDP.186 







After examining the total defense expenditures for Portugal from 2005-2012 it 
appears as though defense spending took a hit between 2006-2007 when the country was 
struggling to reduce their budget deficit that had recently risen above the 3% mandated 
by the Euro zone’s Stability and Growth Pact.  Moreover, Portugal’s defense spending hit 
all-time lows as the three year bailout package was rolled out and austerity measures 
were put in place.  The defense expenditure data above indicates that the political will of 
the state to contribute to defense budgets is low as shown by their willingness to decrease 
defense spending as a measure to reduce budget deficits as well as the continued 
reduction through the financial crisis that the country is currently trying to work through. 
186 Ibid. 
187 “Defense Data Portal,” European Defense Agency, http://www.eda.Europa.eu/info-




                                                          
Portugal:  Social Program Spending 
 Portugal, for the most part, has held total public social expenditures at a steady 
rate of GDP that was experienced right before their budget deficit ballooned and initiated 
the economic crisis within the country.  In 2006, Portugal’s total government spending 
was 23% of GDP.188  In 2007 that number fell just slightly to 22.7% of GDP.189  That 
figure increased in both 2008 and 2009.  In 2008 the total public social expenditures was 
23.1% of GDP and in 2009 the number peaked at 25.6% of GDP.190  Once the number 
peaked in 2009, it fell for the next three years as the country struggled to deal with an 
inflating budget deficit and subsequent bailout and austerity measures that were enforced 
on the government as a stipulation for the bailout money.  In 2010, government social 
spending fell just slightly to 25.4% of GDP; in 2011, it continued to fall to 25% of GDP; 
and in 2012 the number held steady at 25%.191   
 The data above provides an indication that public support for security 
cooperation, when comparing defense spending data from the previous section to 
government social spending, has been slightly reduced.  Prior to 2010 both defense 
spending and government social spending, as a whole, steadily increased; however, after 
2010 just prior to the bailout total defense expenditures steadily decreased as total public 
social expenditures held steady at their levels prior to the financial crisis. 
 







                                                          
Conclusion: 
 While each country experienced an economic crisis, each crisis was created by 
differing conditions and each country was offered varying bailouts to remedy the crisis.  
The crisis in Greece was rooted in overspending by the government coupled with a 
decreased collection of taxes and has been attempted to be resolved through a 
combination of bailout loans provided by the European Union and the IMF.  Similarly, 
the crisis in Portugal was caused by a ballooning budget deficit and was once again 
remedied by a bailout package provided by International Monetary Fund, European 
Central Bank, and the European Commission.  On the other hand, Spain experienced an 
economic crisis caused by a housing bubble burst, not by government overspending or a 
decline in tax collection, and has received a bailout provided by the European Financial 
Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism.  The primary difference 
between the three bailout packages provided is that the two bailout packages provided by 
the IMF, which included Greece and Portugal had austerity measures attached to the 
terms of the bailout, while the bailout package provided to Spain was pulled from a 
Eurozone fund established to help struggling countries and thus had no austerity 
measures attached.  The austerity measures involved extreme spending cuts, increases in 
taxes and pension reforms, among other things.  After examining the particular 
circumstances of each crisis and bailout package it appears that the political will and 
public support for security cooperation decreased within the two countries that had 
bailouts with austerity measures, while it would seems that security cooperation would be 
wholly unaffected within Spain, which received a bailout without austerity measures.
 Defense spending for Greece remained largely unaffected prior to the financial 
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crisis but took a considerable hit during and after the financial crisis indicating that the 
political will for security cooperation was adversely affected by the economic crisis.  
Similarly, defense spending within Portugal decreased prior to and throughout the 
financial crisis in an attempt to lower budget deficits indicating that the political will of 
Portugal to contribute to security cooperation within the European Union was adversely 
affected by the financial crisis.  In Spain there was a direct correlation between defense 
spending and the economic health of the state, meaning as one improved or worsened 
defense spending mirrored the trend.  Overall, Greece and Portugal, the two states that 
were impacted by austerity measures, portrayed similar results with both Greece’s and 
Portugal’s defense spending being reduced in response to rising budget deficits.  The 
second indicator that was examined to determine the affect of the economic crisis’ on 
security cooperation was social spending as an indication of public support for security 
cooperation. 
 Government social spending within Greece did not follow a specific trend prior 
to, during, or after the economic crisis with social spending experiencing both gains and 
losses throughout the six year trend studied.  This indicates that public support within 
Greece for security cooperation within the European Union was once again generally 
unaffected by the economic crisis of 2008.  Conversely, social spending within Portugal 
held steady at levels experienced prior to the economic crisis while defense spending fell 
as a percentage of GDP which indicates that public support for security cooperation 
decreased after the economic crisis.  Similarly, Spain experienced decreased public 
support for security cooperation as social spending increased exponentially as defense 
spending decreased with the economic struggles of the state.  
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     After examining the particulars of each economic crisis and subsequent bailout and 
defense and social spending trends for the years prior to, during, and after each country’s 
crisis, it appears that the economic crisis did alter the political will and public support for 


















The goal of this thesis, through the examination of the three research topics 
outlined throughout the chapters, was to scrutinize various factors that have affected 
security cooperation and subsequently intelligence sharing within the European Union.  
Although the idea of collective security has been around for thousands of years it has not 
received an extremely large amount of attention on the worldwide stage.  Participation in 
collective security initiatives within regional and international organizations would 
provide forums and avenues through which participating states could combine resources 
to thwart attacks throughout the world.  This is especially significant in today’s world 
which is marred by security threats that have expanded across national boundaries and 
dispersed around the world and states that are facing these threats in an era marked by 
economic instability and constrained resources.  By examining factors that have, and 
continue to affect security cooperation among member states of regional organizations, 
lessons can and have been drawn that provides a path for increased security cooperation 
and arguably the ability to prevent future acts of aggression among infrastructure, 
citizens, and states alike. 
Examining the relationship between the growth of the European Union and 
security cooperation amongst member states indicated that growth in regional 
organizations did contribute to increased security cooperation.  This is a relatively 
notable finding because up until the late 1940’s the widely held belief by the majority of 
the political community was that states could not work in meaningful cooperative groups 
because ultimately they would aim to seek an advantage over other member states.  The 
findings of this chapter showed that not only can states work in meaningful collective 
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security groups, but those groups can also obtain more members and still see positive 
interactions within the security cooperation realm.  While this thesis portfolio focused 
almost solely on security cooperation within the European Union, further research on 
various other regional or international organizational growth in relation to security 
cooperation would provide a deeper breadth of examples to fully understand the 
connection between growth and security cooperation.   
Chapter two examined the impact of four factors on intelligence sharing within 
the European Union and NATO.  Ultimately this chapter proved that intelligence sharing 
within NATO is stronger than within the European Union for a number of reasons.  
Those reasons include:  a lack of rules requiring member states with the EU to share 
intelligence, a lower of level of trust among states within the EU, voluntary and often 
incomplete participation in institutions set up to facilitate sharing intelligence, a restricted 
dissemination process, and an inferior database infrastructure.  While these findings were 
not surprising, as NATO is a more established organization marked by hierarchical 
relationships, the findings were focused enough that they allowed for specific 
recommendations to be made to increase intelligence sharing within the European Union.  
The findings within this chapter were vastly limited due the unclassified nature of the 
portfolio as well as the limited amount of documentation in regards to intelligence 
sharing amongst member states. 
      Chapter three studied the impact of the various economic crises on security 
cooperation within Greece, Spain, and Portugal.  The hypothesis for this chapter was that 
the economic troubles would have had a significant impact on security cooperation; and  
the findings from the three case studies indicated that the crises did have an adverse 
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affect on security cooperation.  To determine the effect of the crises on security 
cooperation the chapter examined the particulars of the economic issues, defense 
spending as a percentage of GDP, and social spending as a percentage of GDP.  The 
results indicated that defense spending decreased while social spending increased within 
Greece throughout the six years that were examined, defense spending was directly 
correlated to the health of the state within Spain while social spending increased, and 
defense spending fell within Portugal, while social spending remained steady.  Further 
case studies including other countries within the European Union that experienced 
economic and financial crises would have provided additional information that may have 
had a significant impact on the findings.  Additionally, due to the recent nature of the 
economic crises, additional research within the next couple of years will further indicate 
if the economic crises have had a significant impact on security cooperation.  
While the theory of collective security has been around for many years, there have 
been few successful collective security efforts.  The purpose of this portfolio was to 
examine that theory in the context of security cooperation within the European Union in 
hopes of shedding light on factors that positively and adversely affect security 
cooperation to further facilitate the creation of new and stronger collective security 










Factors Affecting Intelligence Sharing within the European Union and NATO: 
The table below outlines 4 factors affecting intelligence sharing and provides indicators 
of those factors within the European Union [column 2] and NATO [column 3]. 
 
 








-27 member states 
 
-Lacks a dominant state able to 
create hierarchical agreements 
within the EU 
 
-EU member states (esp. Great 
Britain) are engaged in 
hierarchical relationships with 
states outside of the EU 
 
-28 member states 
 
-Marked by hierarchical 
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-Institutions lack rules that 
require member states to share 
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that call for more intelligence 
sharing 
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